A noncooperative game on polyhedral sets  by Belenky, A.S.
Pergamon 
Computers Math. Applic. Vol. 33, No. 10, pp. 125--133, 1997 
Copyright~)1997 Elsevier Science Ltd 
Printed in Great Britain. All rights reserved 
PII: S0898-1221(97)00081-3 0898-1221/97 $17.00 + 0.00 
A Noncooperat ive  Game 
on Polyhedral  Sets 
A. S. BELENKY 
Operations Research Center, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
One Amherst Street E 40-113, Cambridge, MA 02139, U.S.A. 
and 
Institute of Control Sciences, Russian Academy of Sciences 
Moscow, Russia 
(Received and accepted October 1996) 
Abst ract - -A  problem of a Nash equilibrium point existence and calculating in a noncooperative 
two-person game on generally unbounded polyhedral sets with the payoff functions of two vector 
arguments being those of maximum of finite numbers of linear functions is considered. It is shown 
that the problem is reducible to that in an auxiliary two-person zero-sum game on a polyhedral set 
of connected strategies with the payoff unction being a sum of two linear ones. For the latter game 
verifiable, necessary, and sufficient conditions of its Nash equilibrium points that allow calculating 
the points by solving a system of linear and quadratic onstraints were proposed by the author in [1]. 
Key"words- -Equi l ibr ium points, Noncooperative game, Two-person game, Polyhedral set of con- 
nected strategies, Polyhedral sets, Quadratic onstraints. 
1. THE PROBLEM STATEMENT AND 
MATHEMATICAL  FORMULATION 
We consider a problem of a Nash equil ibrium point existence and calculat ing in the two-person 
game with the payoff functions of the players 
f (x ,y)  = min {(ai,x) + (b i ,y)},  
iEl,m 
~O(x,y) = min {(c j ,x)  + (dj,y)}, 
jEl,n 
where x E H,  y E f~, and H and S are general ly unbounded polyhedral  sets of al lowable strategies 
of the first and the second player, respectively. As usual, we assume that  (x*, y*) E H x S is a 
Nash equi l ibr ium point in the considered game if 
I(x,y*) < I(z*,y*), 
~(x*, y) < ~(x', y*), 
for any x E H, 
for any y E S. 
To avoid the tr ivial  considerations, it is further assumed that  the set Arg max(x,y)EHx S f(x,  y) U 
Arg max(=,~)eHx s ~o(x, y) does not contain Nash equil ibrium points of the game. 
This  game can serve as a model for some situations related to t rade and t ransportat ion,  one of 
which considered in this art icle is as follows. Two regional brokers are involved in t rade between 
The results in this paper were partly obtained by the author in 1993-1994 when he was working at Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology. 
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the two regions, each of which has several enterprises that manufacture commodities being of 
interest for the enterprises in the other region. All enterprises within each region are represented 
by one of the two brokers. Each commodity manufactured in each region is needed by at least 
one enterprise from the other region. For each enterprise in both regions, there are known its 
capacity for each manufactured commodity and its demand for each commodity manufactured in 
the other region. In each region, the enterprises can sell themselves a part of the manufactured 
commodities in a certain market and agree to deal with the regional broker only if the latter 
provides an appropriate l vel of profit to them. 
In turn, the brokers agree to deal just with those clients (enterprises) who have the appro- 
priate and commensurable caliber in terms of potential revenue from selling their merchandise 
and expenses for buying the needed ones, as the brokers' profits depend on those amounts of 
money. Each broker is aware of the existing transportation expenses along with the delivery 
insurance xpenses for moving merchandise manufactured by each enterprise in the region which 
he represents o each enterprise in the other region. 
Based on all this information, the brokers try to come to terms in order to make the trade deal 
happen by choosing volumes of the manufactured commodities to be sold and moved between 
the regions and proposing the profit level to each of their potential clients in the regions, and 
then either including them in the deal or finding new clients manufacturing similar commodities. 
In fact, the interaction between the brokers and their clients is organized as an iterative pro- 
cedure at each step of which a finite number of enterprises from each region becomes involved in 
the 'trade deal by the regional brokers. Such an interaction at an arbitrary step is done as the 
brokers' attempt o form a proposal for the clients (involved in the deal at this step) that secures 
an acceptable l vel of the profits to them. The interactive procedure is arranged in such a way 
that the next step in it is done if the mutually acceptable proposal at the current step is not 
found for any reason, so that at least one new client becomes involved in the further negotiations 
to find the acceptable proposal at the next step. 
To simplify further notations, we hereinafter consider a model of the brokers' behaviour an 
arbitrary step of the above mentioned interactive procedure. 
Let 
m be the number of enterprises included by the broker in finding a mutually acceptable 
proposal in region 1; 
n be the number of enterprises included by the broker in finding a mutually acceptable 
proposal in region 2; 
0 be the number of commodities manufactured in region 1; 
a be the number of commodities manufactured in region 2; 
x~j be the volume of commodity k manufactured by enterprise i in region 1 to be delivered to 
enterprise j in region 2, i E 1, m, j E 1, n, k E 1, 8; 
~i be the volume of commodity l manufactured by enterprise j in region 2 to be delivered to 
enterprise i in region 1, i E 1,m, j E 1,n, I E 1,a; 
a~ be the price asked by the broker for enterprise i in region 1 for a unit of its commodity k, 
i E 1,rn, k E 1,8; 
be the price asked by the broker for enterprise j in region 2 for a unit of its commodity l, 
j E 1,n, l E 1,a; 
be the cost of transportation and delivery insurance of a unit of commodity k from enter- OAkj 
prise i in region 1 to enterprise j in region 2, i E 1,m, j E 1,n, k E 1,--~; 
A~ be the cost of transportation and delivery insurance of a unit of commodity I from enter- 
prise j in region 2 to enterprise i in region 1, i E 1,m, j E 1,n, l E 1,a; 
xkj be the demand for commodity k manufactured in region 1 existing for enterprise j in 
region 2, j E 1, n, k E 1, 0; 
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eli be the demand for commodity l manufactured in region 2 existing for enterprise i in 
region 1, i E I -~ ,  l E 1,a; 
~r~ be the volume of commodity k manufactured byenterprise i in region 1 that is available 
to the broker selling it to region 2, i • ,l--,-,-,~, k • 1, O; 
~l" be the volume of commodity l manufactured byenterprise j in region 2 that is available 
to the broker selling it to region 1, j E 1,n, l • 1,a. 
The following obvious relations hold: 
}7l 
Ex~j  _> xkj, k • 1,--'8, j • 1,n, (1) 
i f f i l  
I2 
Ey~i>_eli, l• l ,a ,  i• l ,m,  (2) 
j-~-I 
n 
~_x~j<_Tr~, k• l ,0 ,  i • l ,m,  (3) 
j--1 
EyZ~ __ ~,  l e 1,a, j • 1,n. (4) 
i----1 
Each broker is interested in selling and buying commodities for his clients in volumes that secure 
a certain level of the commission fees (the brokers usually get the commission as a percentage 
of the money involved in selling and buying the commodities). It means that some additional 
relations hold, for example, 
> (5) 
i-----1 jffiffil k= l  
i=1  j----1 
j= l  i----1 / - -1  
i i 
j----1 i----1 k----1 
where rl~, A~ are percents of the commissions that the first broker has from enterprise i involved 
in the deal for selling its commodities and buying the commodities for it, while ~1, #1 are the 
total commissions that the first broker has in region 1 for selling and buying the commodities, 
respectively; the same sense have rl~, A~, and ~,  #2. 
It is assumed that system (1)-(8) has a feasible solution or the brokers can correct some of the 
numbers in the right-hand side of relations (1)-(8) in order to make the corrected system have 
such a solution. The analysis of solvability of system (1)-(8) and the further correction (if it 
becomes necessary) can be done, in particular, by the method proposed by the author in [2], that 
enables the brokers to conduct he analysis using standard linear programming software. It is 
n m also assumed that the proper elations between ~j=l  XkJ and }-~i=17r~, as well as those between 
~rn-_l eu and Y~=I ~t', k • 1-~, I • 1~ hold, that xkj and e~ reflect he minimal demands for 
the commodities and that the enterprises are ready to buy the products in volumes that can 
exceed the minimal demands and that each broker gets his commission from each enterprise for 
the whole volumes of selling and buying that he does for it. Finally, prices for the commodities 
to be sold and bought are assumed to be constant for a certain period of time (within which the 
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bargain is done) and reflect all the discounts available to the brokers, so that they are better than 
those available to the enterprises directly. 
For enterprise i from region 1, the profit that can be secured by the broker is 
0 n a n O n 
ZZa~: ( I - I I : )x~j - ( I+A~)ZZb~-ZZw~jx~: j ,  i E l ,m,  
k : l  j--1 1:1 j : l  k= l  j - - I  
while for enterprise j from region 2, the profit that can be secured by the broker is 
¢r m 0 m ¢7 m j • 
/ :1  i :1  k : l  i--1 / :1  i :1  
where it is assumed that the commodities selling is done under CIF conditions. 
The brokers' behavior at each step of the iterative procedure can be described as that of two 
players in a game on the polyhedral sets 
H = {x > 0: Gx >_ p}, 
with the payoff unctions 
S = {y >_ 0: Fy > q}, (9) 
f (x,  y) = min {(ai, x) + (bi, y)}, (10) 
i61,m 
~(x, y) = min {(cj, x) + (dj, y)}, (11) 
jEl,n 
i • (~);  bi, cj, dj are vectors of where x = (xl, . . . ,Xra), xi = (xkj), y = (Yl,.. ,Yn), Yj = ai, 
corresponding dimensions which components are easily calculated from the numbers a~:, 7/~ and 
w i q and A~, a~ and A~, ~, q and AJi, respectively, G, F, p, q are matrices and vectors of k j ,  
corresponding dimensions nonzero elements which are easily calculated from coefficients and the 
right-hand sides of the inequalities of system (1)-(8). 
In this game, a Nash equilibrium point (x*, y*) such that 
(12) 
(13) 
fix*, y*) = m~ f i  x, y*), 
~0(x*, y*) = ma~_ ~o(x*, y), 
yES 
is expedient to search by both players to secure their clients' interests. 
2. BASIC RESULTS 
We further consider game (12),(13), assuming that the polyhedral sets H and S are generally 
unbounded. Let 
(X, Wl ,W2)  =u~O,  (y, W3,W4) =v~_O, ~l,W2, W3,W4 e RI+, (ai ,--] , l )  =ai ,  
(bi,0,0)=b,, (cj ,0,0)=~j, (d j , -1 ,1 )=~,  i e l ,m,  je l ,n ,  
and let A, B, C, D be matrices whose rows are the vectors ~,, bi, ~j, ~,  respectively, G = 
[G, Owt, Ow2], F = [F, Ows, Ow4] be matrices, where Owt, Ow2, O~s, Ow4 are zero vector columns, 
and ~u = COx, 1, -1), ~v = (Or, 1, -1), where Oz, Oy are zero vectors of corresponding dimen- 
sions. 
Further, let 
, , o .  
OA 
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be matrices and the vector, where OA, OS, Ore, On are zero matrices and zero vectors of 
corresponding dimensions and let T = {(~, v~ > 0: A~ + B~ _> h}. 
THEOREM 1. The pair of vectors (x*,y*) is a Nash equilibrium point for game (12),(13) if 
and only if there exist the numbers w~ >_ 0, w~ ~_ O, w~ >_ O, w~ >_ 0 such that the vectors 
~* = (x*, w~, w~) and ~* = (y*, w~, w~) axe solutions to the linear programming problems 
and 
w~ - w2 --* max (14) 
(Z,Wl,W2)~__O: (a i , z}+(b i ,y*}~Wl -W~,  i~l- ' -~, x~H 
w3 - w4 -~ max (15)  
(~,ws,w4)>0: (cj,x')+(d~,~)>_ws-w4, j~ n ,  ~S 
respectively. 
PROOF. Necessity. Let (x*,y*) be a Nash equilibrium point for game (12),(13). Further, let 
miniel--~{(a~,x*) + (bi,y*)} = z*, then (hi,X*) + (b~,y*) >_ z* for any i E 1,m so (x*,w~,w]) is 
a feasible solution to problem (14) for any w~, w~ > 0 such that w~ - w~ = z*. If (x°,wl,w2)o o is 
another feasible solution to problem (14) and w ° - w ° = z °, then we have (ai,x °) + (bi, y*) >_ z ° 
for any i e 1,m and min~el--~{(a~,x °) + (b~,y*)} > z °. From the definition of (x*,y*), we have 
that 
* *=z*= min {(ai,x*)+(b,,y*)} > min ((a~,x°)+(bi ,y*)} >z°=w° l -w°  , ~)1 - -  W2 - -  _ _  - -  
iE l ,m iE l , rn  
which means that (x*, w~, w~) is an optimal solution to problem (14). Analogously, (y*, w~, w~) 
is an optimal solution to problem (15) for any w~, w~ _> 0 such that 
w 3 - w 4 = min {(cj, x*) + (dj, y*)} 
j E l ,n  
Sufficiency. Let (x*,w~,w~) be an optimal solution to problem (14). It means that 
(a~, x*) + (bi, y*) _> w~ - w~ = z*, 
for any i E 1, m, so 
At the same time 
min {(hi,X*) + (b~,y*)} = f(x*,y*) > z*. 
iEl,rn 
f(x,y*) = min ((as,x) ÷ (bi,y*)} <_ z*, 
i E l ,m 
for any x E H, because if for some vector x ° E H, we have 
f (x°,y *) = min ( (a i ,x  °) + (b~,y*) } -- w ° - w ° = z ° > z*, 
i E l , rn  
for some w ° > 0, w ° :> 0, so that (a,,x°l +(bi, y*) > w ° -w  ° for any i E 1,m, then it means that 
the vector (x  °, o 0 • • wl,w2) is a feasible solution to problem (14) and (x ,wl,w~) is not the optimal 
one as z* < z °. So f ix ,  y *) < f(x*,y*) for any x E H. The same reasoning is applied to be 
certain that ~o(x*,y) <_ ~(x*,y*) for any y E S. The two inequalities mean that the pair of 
vectors (x*, y*) is a Nash equilibrium point for game (12),(13). Theorem 1 is proved. 
Let 
n(~*) = ((~,~*)>_ 0 : A~ + BO* _> 0, O~>p,F~*>_q), 
riCO') = ((~,o'):  (~,~*)~ ~)  
= {(~,o')_>o: A~+ BO* >0, C~+ D~* >0, O~>V, kO* >_ q}, 
~(~' ) - -{ (~* ,0 )  _> 0 : C~* + D~_> 0, O~*>_p, kO>_q} 
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THEOREM 2. 
only if 
and 
The pair of vectors (x*,y*) is a Nash equilibrium point for game (12), (13) if and 
(~*,~) E Argmax (~u,~)N Argmax (~v,~) 
(u,v*)~T (u*,v)eT 
(16) 
max (~u, ~) _ max (~u, ~) = w I - w2, 
(~.~*)e~ (~.~*)en(~*) 
max.  (~, 9) = max (~, 'u) ---- W~ - -  W 4.  
(a*,~)er (~',~)e~(~') 
PROOF. Su~ciency is straightforward from Theorem 1. Necessity. Let(x*, y*) be a Nash equi- 
librium point for game (12),(13). Then, by Theorem 1, there exist the numbers w~ > 0, w~ >_ 0 
such that 
(x*,w~,w~) = ~* E Argmax (~,u~. 
ue~(v*) 
It is obvious that the set fl(~*) = {(~,~*) : (~,~*) E T} = {(~,~*) _>0: A~+ B~* >0, Cu + 
D~* > 0, G~ >_ p, ~v* >__ q} is a polyhedral subset of the polyhedral set fl(~*) so that the linear 
function (~,  u-) attains its maximum on ~(U*) [3] and one attains at the vector ~* as the system 
of linear inequalities C~* + DU* _> 0, G~* > p and, consequently, the inclusion (~*,U*) E fl(U*) 
holds by the theorem assumption. It means that (~*, ~*) • Arg max(~,~.)e~(~=, ) and 
max.  (~,  ~) = max (~,  fi) = wi - w 2. 
(~,~')eT (,~,~.)e~(~.) 
- v 8 Analogously, (fi*,~*) E Argmax(a.,¢)eT(~ , ) and 
max.  (~, 9) = max (~', 0) = w~ - w~, 
(~*,~)eT (~*,~)en(~*) 
so (16),(17) hold. 
Su]flciency is straightforward from Theorem 1. 
Theorem 2 is proved. 
Let (F, u-), (~, v-'), be linear functions on T and 
Ep ¢(~,v - )={(~* ,~*)ET :~(~,~*)<¢(~* ,~)<¢(~* ,v - )  vC~*,v-)ET, V(~,~*)ET},  
where ~(~, v-) = i F, ~ + (~, v~. 
THEOREM 3. For 
(~*,~) E Argmax (F,~ n Argmax <~,W>, 
it is necessary and sufficient that 
Ep 
where ~(~,~) = (F,~) + (-~,~). 
PROOF. Necessity. Let 
(~*, ~*) e Arg max ( F, ~) N Arg max <~, ~>. 
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Then, (F,~*) > (F,~) for any (~,~) e T and (~,~*) > (~,~) for any (~*,~) e T, so that 
(-~,~'*) < (-~,~') for any (~*,~ e T. Since ~(~*,~*) = (F,~*) + (-~,~'*), from the above 
notations, we have 
for any (~*, ~) ~ T, and 
for any (~,~*) E T which means that (~*,~*) E Ep(~,~)e~(~,~ ). 
Sufficiency. Let (~*, ~*) E Ep(~,~)e~(~, ). Then, from the definition of Ep(~,~)e~ ~(~, ~), 
we have (~,~*) ~ (~',~) for any (~,~'*) E T and (1,~*) > (1,v~ for any (~*,~) E :F, which means 
that 
(~*, ~*) E Argmax (F, ~) n Arg max (~, ~). 
Theorem 3 is proved. 
Thus, existence of a Nash equilibrium point of game (12),(13) is equivalent to that of an 
equilibrium point of the function 
= - 
on the polyhedral set of pairs :F for which the equalities (17) hold such that calculating a Nash 
equilibrium point in the considered game is reducible to that of an equilibrium point in the 
auxiliary two-person zero-sum game on the polyhedral set T of connected strategies (~, v-) with 
the payoff unction (~u, u~ - (~v, v~. As shown in [1], the latter problem is reducible to solving 
an auxiliary system of linear and quadratic onstraints and various methods, in particular, the 
one proposed in [4] can be employed for solving the system. 
As also shown in [1], Nash equilibrium points of a two-person zero-sum game on a polyhedral 
set of connected strategies with the payoff unction of the kind are, in fact, vector components 
of super vectors of the set being the intersection of two auxiliary surfaces and a polyhedral set. 
So, the geometry of the Nash equilibrium points set is determined by that of the intersection. 
However, some features of the Nash equilibrium points set, in particular, games of that kind 
can also be established by direct consideration of the appropriate xamples. For instance, the 
example given below shows that the set of Nash equilibrium points of the considered game may 
be unbounded for the unbounded sets H and S. 
EXAMPLE 1. Let 
H = e R2: x l  > 1 ,z2  > 1,x2 < z l} ,  
S = {(Yl,Y2) e R2: Yl ~ 1, y2 _ 1,yl _< Y2}, 
f ((Xl, X2), (Yl, Y2)) = min {x2 -- xl, Yl}, 
~9 ((xi, x2), (Yl, Y2)) -- min {Xl, Vl - Y2}, 
L = {(xl,x2), (Yl,Y2) E S x S: xl = x2 ,  Y i  - -  Y2} .  
Further, let Np(f, ~, H, S) be the set of Nash equilibrium points of the considered game, where 
the sets of the players' strategies are H and S and their payoff unctions are f i  x, y) and ~(x, y), 
respectively. 
ASSERTION. L -- Np(f, W, H, S). 
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PROOF. We first show that L C Np(f, to, H, S). We have 
f ((X~, X~), (Yl, Y2)) = min {x~ - Xl, Yl } = min{0, y;} = 0 
and 
((xl, x; ) ,  (Yl, Y2)) = rain {x 1, Yl - Y; } = min{xl, 0} = 0, 
for any ((x~, x~), (y~, y~)) • L. 
At the same time, we have 
/ ((Xl, x2), (y;, y;)) = min (x2 - x,, y~} = x2 - x, <_ 0, 
for any (Xl, 22) • H and 
((Xl, X2), (Yl, Y2)) = min {xl, Yl -- Y2} = Yl -- Y2 < 0, 
for any (Yl, Y2) E S. 
It means that ((x~, x~), (y~, y~)) • Np(f, ~, H, S), so that L C Np(f, ~, H, S). 
To show that Np(/,  to, H, S) C L, we assume that ((xl,x2) , °  0 (Yl,Y2))° 0 • Np(f, ~, H, S). 
from the Nash equilibrium point definition, we have 
s ((x?, (v?, v°)) _> f (vo, y°)), 
Then, 
which means that 
rain {x ° - x° ,y  °} = x 0 - x ° > min {x2 - xl,Y°l } = x2 - Xl,  
for any (X l ,X2)  E H .  As for (~1,32) E H such that 31 = 32, we have 0 >_ x ° -X°l _> 32 - -31  = 0, 
we conclude that x ° = x °. 
xO xO 0 0 Analogously, one can show that y0 = yO, which means that (( 1, 2) , (Y l ,Y2) )  E L and 
Np(f, ~0, H, S) C L. 
The assertion is proved. 
3. CONCLUSIVE  REMARKS 
1. For aught, the author knows that the possibility of reducing the problem of finding a Nash 
equilibrium point of a noncooperative game of the considered kind on polyhedral sets to 
that of an equilibrium point of a two-person zero-sum game on an auxiliary polyhedral set 
of connected strategies was demonstrated for the first time in this article. 
2. It is easy to figure out that various sufficient conditions of a Nash equilibrium point for 
game (12),(13) can be proposed. For example, if 
(~*,~) e Argmax{<{u,~) + ({",~)}, 
where ~* = (x* ,w~,w~)  >_ 0, ~* = ~v[-*, W's, w*~4) -> 0, and (17) holds, then (x* ,y*)  is a 
Nash equilibrium point for game (12),(13). However, the latter inclusion, along with (17), 
being the sufficient conditions are not necessary ones for Nash equilibrium points of game 
(12),(13), as one can see from the following example. 
EXAMPLE 2. Let 
H--{(xl,x2 )_>0: -xl+x2_<2, Xl+2X2 <_7, 2x1+x2 <_8}, 
~-" { (Y l ,  ~/2) >--- O: Yl <~ 3, Y2 < 3}, 
f ((xl, x2), (Yl, Y2)) = min {2x2, Y2}, 
((xl, x2), (Yl, Y2)) = min {Xl, Yl}. 
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It is easy to see that, in particular, the points ((3,2),(3,3)) and ((0,2),(3,3)) are Nash equilibrium 
ones of the considered noncooperative game as 
f ((3, 2), (3, 3)) = rain{4, 3} = 3, 
f ((Xl, ~2), (3, 3)) = min{2x2, 3} _< 3, 
which means that 
and 
as well as 
/ ((xl, x2), (3, 3)) < f ((3, 2), (3, 3)), 
((3, 2), (Yl, Y2)) _< ~ ((3, 2), (3, 3)), 
~o ((3, 2), (3, 3)) = min{3, 3} = 3, 
qo ((3, 2), (Yl, Y~)) = min{3, Yl } _< 3, 
for any (xl, z2) E H 
for any (Yl, Y2) E S, 
f ((0, 2), (3, 3)) = min{4, 3) = 3, 
f ((x2, x2), (3, 3)) = min{2x2, 3} < 3, 
which means that 
/ (3, 3)) < f ((0, 2), (3, 3)), 
and 
((0, 2), (yl, Y2)) _< ~a (C 0, 2), (3, 3)), 
We also notice that the set T can be written in the form 
2X2 --Wl "]" W2 
Y2 --Wl "1"- W2 
Xl 
Xl -- X2 
--Xl  -- 2X2 
-2x l  - x2 
whereas, 
Yl 
-y, 
--Y2 
~o ((0, 2), (3, 3)) = rain{0, 3} = 0, 
qo ((0, 2), (Yl, Y2)) = min{0, Yl} = 0, 
for any (Xl, x2) E H 
for any (Yl, Y2) E S. 
>- 0, 
> 0, 
-w3+w4 >- 0, 
-w3+w4 >- 0, 
>- -2,  
>_ -7,  
> -8, 
>- -3,  
>_-3, 
<~U,~) .{_ (~u, ~> = Wl  -- W2 "q- W3 -- W4- 
(,) 
It is obvious that inequalities (,) hold for any w~ >- 0, wJ _> 0, w; >- 0, w~ >- 0 such that w~ - 
* * * * W* W* W *~ w~ = 3 and w~ -w~ = 3 as the point (X l ,X2 ,Y l ,Y2 ,  1 ,w~,w~,w~)  = (3, 2, 3, 3, w~, w~, 3, 4J 
is a feasible solution to (,) where the function wl - w2 + w3 - w4 yields its value equal to 6. 
At the same time inequalities (,) also hold for any w ° >- 0, w ° >- 0, w ° >- 0, w ° >- 0 
such that w 0 - w ° = 3 and w3 ° - w ° = 0 as the point (Xl,0 x2 ,0 ~1,~2,n° oo w ol,w2,w3,o o w o) = 
0 0 0 0 w3, w4) also a ( 0, 2, 3, 3, w 1, w 2, is feasible solution to (*) where the function wl w2 + w3 - w4 
yields its value equal to 3, so the latter point cannot be the point of maximum of the function 
(~u, ~> + (~V,v ~ on the set T = {(~,v~ >- 0: AT+ S~ > h}. 
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